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reated by SB 37 (Maddy) (Chapter 12, Statutes of
1993), the Bureau of State Audits (BSA) is an audit
ing and investigative agency which operates under
the administrative oversight of the Milton Marks Commis
sion on California State Government Organization and
Economy (also known as the "Little Hoover Commission").
In Government Code section 8543 et seq., SB 37 delegates
to BSA most of the duties previously performed by the Audi
tor General's Office, such as examining and reporting annu
ally upon the financial statements prepared by the executive
branch of the state, performing other related assignments
(such as performance audits) that are mandated by statute,
and administering the Reporting of Improper Governmental
Activities Act, Government Code section 8547 et seq. BSA
is also required to conduct audits of state and local govern
ment requested by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee
(JLAC) to the extent that funding is available. BSA is headed
by the State Auditor, appointed by the Governor to a four
year term from a list of three qualified individuals submitted
by the JLAC.

C

Maj or Proj ects

The Cost of the PUCs Regulation of
Trans,portation Companies

In California Public Utilities Commission: It Does Not
Know Its True Costs ofRegulating Transportation Compa
nies (No. 9802 1; December 1998), BSA examined the fees
collected by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) from
privately-owned freight railroad and passenger transporta
tion companies (transportation companies), and found they
may not sufficiently cover the costs of regulating these com
panies. As a result, the PUC's other fee-payers, such as truck
ing and utility companies, may subsidize freight railroad and
passenger transportation regulation. Because its former ac
c ounting system did not isolate expendi tures for the
Commission's various funds, the PUC does not know the true
cost of transportation regulation during fiscal year 1997-98.
Consequently, its other fee-payers may have subsidized up
to $91 9,000 for these costs.
In addition, fees received from railroad corporations did
not cover all of the Commission's corresponding expenses
because the Public Utilities Code limits the amount and types
of costs for which the Commission can use such moneys.
Nonetheless, the PUC spent approximately $2.9 million on
allowed railroad costs-$ 119,000 less than the $3 million
cap established by the Code. Finally, the PUC installed a new
accounting system in July 1998 that allows it to separate costs
by fund. However, in determining which costs it should allo
cate to its various funds, the PUC excluded $5. 1 million in
overhead expenses for facilities. Unless it properly allocates

all relevant c osts on the new accounting
system, the Commission will continue to
be unable to determine the true costs of providing services to
transportation companies and other fee-payers.
BSA recommended that the PUC, to ensure that its other
fee-payers are not subsidizing railroad safety regulation, press
for legislation allowing it to use railroad corporation fees to
pay a fair share of its overhead costs. To determine its true
costs of regulating utility and transportation companies, BSA
suggested that the Commission equitably allocate all relevant
overhead costs, including rent for its headquarters building,
to its various funds.

Auditor Criticizes OSHPD,s Cal-Mortgage
Loan Insurance Program

In Office of Statewide Health Planning and Develop
ment: The Cal-Mortgage Program Does Not Minimize the
State's Financial Risk When Insuring Health Facility Debt
(No. 97108; October 1998), BSA evaluated the Cal-Mortgage
Loan Insurance Program (Cal-Mortgage) administered by the
Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development
(OSHPD). Cal-Mortgage insures loans for health facility con
struction in California, including hospitals, primary care clin
ics, and elderly care facilities. Many of Cal-Mortgage's cli
ents are high-risk borrowers that c ould not obtain loans with
out this insurance because their projects are deemed too risky.
Accordingly, the likelihood of default for Cal-Mortgage cli
ents is significantly higher than it is for clients of larger, pri
vate insurers. When its borrowers default and are unable to
continue payment on their debt, Cal-Mortgage must pay off
the insured debt. Although the very nature of dealing with
high-risk borrowers increases the likelihood of defaults, BSA
found that Cal-Mortgage further increases its risk of client
defaults with its ineffectual application process, vague guide
lines, and incomplete and inconsistent monitoring.
BSA's audit revealed that Cal-Mortgage does not ad
equately screen applicants because it does not adhere to ob
jective guidelines in its application process. It does not use
all available information or standard procedures to assess its
applicants' financial viability, nor has it established proce
dures for determining its maximum level of risk when insur
ing a client. Due to this inadequate process, Cal-Mortgage
has insured a number of financially unstable applicants, some
of which have defaulted on their loans. Cal-Mortgage does
not consistently require that borrowers submit information
about their financial condition, and it does not consistently
conduct timely or structured site visits with borrowers. As a
result, Cal-Mortgage may have little notice of financial diffi
culties before a borrower defaults on its debt. Weaknesses in
its monitoring include inconsistent methods to oversee bor
rowers, a lack of formal procedures for this oversight, and
insufficient supervision by Cal-Mortgage management.
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Moreover, Cal-Mortgage cannot effectively monitor the
risk in its borrower portfolio because the portfolio database
is unreliable, contains numerous errors, and is not properly
maintained. Finally, because Cal-Mortgage does not have
benchmarks or standard criteria for identifying problem bor
rowers that require executive management intervention, the
director of the OSHPD, which oversees this insurance pro
gram, may not be fully aware of the risk present in Cal
Mortgage's portfolio.
To improve consistency and minimize the risk of finan
cial loss to the state, BSA recommended that Cal-Mortgage
develop a more rigorous process to determine the financial
viability of applicants, and define a maximum level of risk
that it will accept when insuring a borrower. BSA also sug
gested that the legislature consider changing the law to re
quire that Cal-Mortgage develop a maximum level of insur
ance risk acceptable for loan insurance approval. The new
law should ensure that Cal-Mortgage sets the risk level to
minimize the potential of loan defaults and the resulting de
fault payments from the Health Facilities Construction Loan
Insurance Fund, while still being able to accomplish its statu
tory mission. To ensure that Cal-Mortgage adequately over
sees its borrowers and is sufficiently warned of those experi
encing financial difficulties, BSA recommended that it es
tablish a standard monitoring system for tracking and ana
lyzing borrowers' financial information. To improve its man
agement information for monitoring and oversight, Cal-Mort
gage should periodically review the portfolio database for
errors and develop procedures for maintaining and ensuring
the integrity of the database. Finally, Cal-Mortgage should
develop benchmarks and standard criteria for calling an at
risk borrower's financial status to OSHPD's attention, to en
sure that OSHPD management has the information necessary
to assess the level of risk in the portfolio.

State Agency Readiness for The Year 2000

In Year 2000 Computer Problem: Progress May Be Overly
Optimistic and Certain Implications Have Not Been Ad
dressed (No. 98023; August 1998), BSA examined the progress
of state agencies in fixing their computer systems to recognize
the year 2000. Thousands of critical state computer systems
must be adapted in order to allow the continued delivery of
essential products and services to Californians. To address this
important issue, Governor Wilson designated the Department
of Information Technology (DOIT) to oversee, coordinate, and
report on efforts agencies are making to ensure that over 2,700
of the state's computer systems are fixed to recognize the year
2000. These efforts involve repairing and testing or replacing
components to recognize both the 20th and 21st centuries. The
DOIT requires agencies, departments, boards, and commissions
under its purview to report the status of their information tech
nology systems and associated remediation efforts on a monthly
basis; at the end of each quarter, DOIT in tum reports to the
administration and the legislature.
B SA surveyed 39 state agencies which report to DOIT
and have critical computer systems, and concluded that al
most 700 of the state's critical computer projects may not be
2 12

as far along as reported by DOIT in its April 1998 quarterly
report to the administration and legislature. Furthermore,
many state agencies have not addressed all facets of the year
2000 problem and, therefore, may not actually be ready for
the next millennium.
Specifically, agencies are prematurely declaring their
critical projects complete that have not been thoroughly tested.
Critical projects are those so important that their failure would
cause a significant negative impact on the health and safety
of Californians, on the fiscal or legal integrity of state opera
tions, or on the continuation of essential state agency pro
grams. Thus far, none of the agencies reporting on completed
critical projects to the DOIT have rigorously tested their in
formation-technology systems, comprised of one or more criti
cal projects, in an isolated environment where the computer's
internal clock is set to dates in the next century to make sure
the systems will continue to function after the year 2000.
Moreover, several agencies responsible for remediating large,
complex systems have yet to even schedule such tests at ei
ther of the state's two data centers. While all critical projects
may not need this type of testing, the fact that none of the ten
agencies reporting completed critical projects to the DOIT
has used such testing on those projects caused BSA concern.
Moreover, in many cases the amount of time agencies are
allocating to test their critical projects falls far short of the
50%-70% of total project time and resources that others in
the industry have spent on testing.
In addition, many of the state's critical computer projects
and systems depend on data exchanges with other entities,
such as counties and the federal government. Yet not all agen
cies have completed the necessary steps to ensure that data
transmitted through these interfaces will work seamlessly with
the state's computer systems into the next century. Even if
agencies successfully fix their own critical computer systems,
they still may not be able to deliver expected products and
services in the next millennium if their data-exchange part
ners' systems are not year 2000-ready.
Finally, the managers of most state agencies have yet to
ensure that their agencies have established appropriate busi
ness continuation plans in the event of failures or delays
caused by the year 2000 problem. Agencies appear to be fo
cusing exclusively on fixing critical computer systems and
choosing not to involve the individuals responsible for pro
gram deiivery in determining what to do if critical systems
do not work as intended or are delayed. However, rather than
using staff involved with remediation, BSA believes the man
agers responsible for the agencies' core business processes
should establish work groups of program staff and dedicate
sufficient resources to develop business continuation plans
to ensure that the agencies maintain the delivery of essential
products and services in the event of year 2000-induced fail
ures or delays.
To ensure uninterrupted delivery of essential products
and services to Californians, BSA recommended that the
Governor's Office ensure that all state agencies take the fol- ·
lowing steps: (1) provide DOIT with accurate information
about the status of their year 2000 remediation efforts-spe-
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cifically, the estimated completion dates for each phase of
remediation, including final completion, should reflect the
agency's best estimate for the actual completion dates and
should be updated whenever circumstances affecting a
project's status change; (2) thoroughly and comprehensively
test the remediation for each critical project; for larger, com
plex projects associated with systems that support the deliv
ery of services to Californians where interruption would be
unacceptable, agencies should also consider testing the sys
tem in an isolated computer environment using a time ma
chine; moreover, prior to declaring a project complete, tests
of any internal interdependencies, external data exchanges,
20th and 21st century date recognition, and the impacts from
embedded systems such as desktop computers, should be com
plete and the project acceptance tested and approved by
agency managers responsible for the business functions; (3)
protect their computer systems from missing or corrupted data
supplied by external parties-specifically, agencies should
identify their data-exchange partners, develop schedules for
testing and implementing new date formats, and thoroughly
test data supplied by external parties; and (4) establish busi
ness continuation planning groups, made up of managers from
major business units, experts in relevant functional areas,
business continuation and disaster recovery specialists, op
erational analysts, and contract specialists; these planning
groups should then follow a structured approach to develop a
business continuation plan for each core business process and
infrastructure component affected by the year 2000 problem.
In addition, to ensure that the administration and the leg
islature have accurate information about state agencies'
progress toward fixing their critical projects and systems
threatened .by year 2000 problems, BSA recommended that
DOIT continue to collect and analyze information state agen
cies provide on their overall progress. If, after analyzing the
reported information, something appears anomalous-such
as too little test time-DOIT should contact the agency for
an explanation. DOIT should also continue to collect infor
mation from agencies on their data-exchange partners. In
addition, it should take appropriate follow-up action if it ap
pears that agencies are not testing their interfaces with data
exchange partners. DOIT should require agencies, as part of
their monthly reporting, to indicate whether they have busi
ness continuation plans that ensure that each core business
function will continue uninterrupted if the critical computer
systems supporting those functions fail to work or are de
layed because of year 2000 problems.
The High Cost of Incarcerating Inmates

In California Department of Co"ections: The Cost of
Incarcerating Inmates in State-Run Prisons ls Higher Than
the Department's Published Cost (No. 97 125; September
1998), BSA analyzed the Department of Corrections' calcu
lation of its costs of incarcerating 146,000 criminals. Each
fiscal year, the Department calculates and publishes the
amount of incarceration costs per inmate. The Department's
calculation focuses primarily on those operating costs directly
related to housing and supporting inmates, such as food, cloth-

ing, health care, and inmate activities. For fiscal year 199697, the Department calculated annual incarceration costs at
$21,012 per inmate. BSA reviewed the Department's calcu
lation and found that, although it appropriately reflects many
of the operating costs, it does not include all costs incurred
by the state. When BSA included all of the costs, it found that
annual incarceration costs were $24,807 per inmate for fiscal
year 1996-97, $3,795 higher per inmate than the Department's
published figure. The total difference of costs to incarcerate
inmates between the Department's calculation and BSA's es
timate is $5 17 million. The primary reason for this difference
is the Department's calculation does not include capital costs,
such as lease-purchase payments, debt service costs for new
construction, and costs of improving and renovating existing
prisons. The Department's calculation also does not include
reimbursements to local governments for transportation costs,
court fees, and county charges related to state inmates. Fi
nally, the Department's calculation does not include its share
of state central-service costs, such as costs of various account
ing functions performed by the State Controller's Office for
other state departments.
BSA calculated the annual incarceration costs per inmate
for each of the 32 state-run prisons operating during fiscal
year 1996-97, as well as the statewide cost per inmate. BSA's
calculation includes all operating and capital costs. BSA found
that annual incarceration costs per inmate vary significantly
from one prison to another, depending on each prison's secu
rity levels, facility types, and age. Annual costs per inmate
for the 32 prisons ranged from $ 18,562 to $38,554 per year.
BSA recommended that, to accurately determine the rel
evant cost of prison operations, the Department should in
clude all operating and capital costs in its calculation of how
much the state pays annually to incarcerate criminals.
Millions Spent on Incomplete Los Angeles
Courthouse Projects

In Los Angeles County: Millions Spent on Courthouse
Projects That May Never Be Built (No. 97119; July 1998),
BSA found that since 1988, Los Angeles County has spent $79
million on eight incomplete courthouse construction projects
financed through its Robbins Courthouse Construction Fund.
Five of these courthouse projects have scant chance of being
built, yet the County spent $ 18.6 million on them-$9.9 mil
lion for planning and design, money from which it will derive
no benefit, and $8.7 million for land that now sits idle.
Following approval of its master courthouse construc
tion program in 1988, the County started eight courthouse
projects. However, it predicated its ambitious program on
revenue projections that, because of subsequent changes in
law, proved to be overly optimistic and cost projections that
were too low. In addition, the County failed to perform com
parative needs assessments and did not prioritize the court
house projects to determine where construction funds could
be most effectively spent. To compound these problems, the
courthouse projects have been plagued by significant delays.
Some of the delays, such as those caused by the Northridge
earthquake and relocation of one courthouse, were out of the
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BTH's primary interest is in business and transportation regu
control of the County. Other delays have resulted from the
lation, rather than the delivery of health care. According to
County's poor control over the projects. Three years into the
BSA, "given the current health plan environment and because
program, an outside consultant warned the County that it could
health care holds a minority interest within the overall opera
not finance the entire courthouse construction program, but
tions of the agency, it seems unlikely that the state would
the County continued to purchase land and develop plans for
again decide today to have this agency regulate health plans."
all eight projects. The County was finally forced to defer six
At the request of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee,
projects in 1994 due to insufficient funding. Had the County
BSA evaluated the "fit" of other ·state agencies to take over
reacted promptly to the consultant's warning, it could have
the regulation of managed care. During its review, BSA ana
prevented spending as much as $7 .8 million of the $9 .9 mil
lyzed the skills, expertise, and focus of the Department of
lion it spent on planning and designing projects it eventually
Consumer Affairs, the Department of Health Services, and
deferred, and $8.6 million on unnecessary land purchases.
the Department of Insurance; BSA did not attempt to ascer
Until revenues increased recently, the County lacked suf
tain the efficiency and effectiveness of operations at these
ficient funding to complete any of the projects it deferred.
However, the County now
departments nor at DOC. BSA
projects that if the current revenue
found that all three departments
levels continue, it will have suffi
to varying degrees, the
perform,
BSA concluded that the regulation. of
cient funding to complete one of
necessary to
functions
of
types
health plans belongs within the Health and
the deferred projects-the Ante
however,
plans;
health
regulate
Welfare Agency.
lope Valley courthouse. BSA rec
BSA concluded that-of the
three-the Department of Health
ommended that the county proceed with caution. These revenues are subject to sudden
Services within the Health and Welfare Agency offers the most
changes, and even small decreases in revenues or increases
suitable environment for the Division.
in costs could jeopardize the County's ability to fund the
Additionally, BSA noted that the state also has the op
project. Unfortunately, the County has not identified the fac
tion of creating an entirely new entity that would perform the
tors that account for the recent increase in revenue. Thus, it
required regulatory functions. Regardless of whether the state
has no assurance its projections are based on realistic assump
moves the Division to an existing department or creates a
tions. As a result, BSA believes the County risks repeating its
new entity, BSA concluded that the regulation of health plans
past mistakes by spending money on projects it cannot com
belongs within the Health and Welfare Agency. In locating
plete.
health plan oversight in this agency, the state can capitalize
Nonetheless, the County has taken steps to improve its
on the agency's expertise and its focus on health care mat
project development process. In 1995, the County reorganized
ters.
some duties and in 1997 it adopted a capital projects manage
Other Reports
ment process. Although these actions appear to address its main
BSA also issued the following reports between July 1 and
problems, the changes are too recent to evaluate in practice.
December 3 1 , 1998: Los Angeles Metropolitan Transporta
To ensure that the County maximizes scarce resources
tion Authority: Creating a Separate San Fernando Valley
for courthouse construction, BSA recommended that the
County conduct a countywide comparative needs assessment Authority Would Take a Split ofAssets, Revenue, and Debt
(No. 98107; July 1998); South Coast Air Quality Manage
and continue projects based on the greatest need. To ensure
ment District: The District Should Establish a More Equi
project funding is realistic, the County should monitor fac
table Emission Fee Structure and Process Permits More
tors that will affect revenues or costs, revise cash flow pro
(No. 971 14; July 1998); Department ofHealth Ser
Promptly
jections, and recommend changes to the courthouse construc
Treatment Authorization Requests Continue to
Drug
vices:
tion program whenever warranted.
Increase (No. 98012; August 1 998); Cajon Valley Union
The Proper Agency to Regulate Managed Care
School District: The District Needs to Improve Its Manage
In Department of Corporations: To Optimize Health
rial Oversight and Accountability (No. 97124; August 1998);
Plan Regulation, This Function Should Be Moved to the
Marks-Roos Bond Act Bo"owings: Several Cities Misused
the Program and Some Financed Risky Projects Which May
Health and Welfare Agency (No. 971 1 8. 1 ; May 1998), BSA
in Investor Losses (No. 97127; September 1998); Prison
Result
examined the regulation of managed care by the Department
of Corporations (DOC) within the Business, Transportation
Industry Authority: Its Outside Purchase of Goods and Ser
vices is Neither Well Planned nor Cost Effective (No. 98102;
and Housing Agency. BSA noted that DOC regulates three
September 1998); State Contracting: The State Can Do More
unique types of businesses: health care service plans, securi
to Save Money When Acquiring Goods and Services (No.
ties and franchise investments, and financial lenders. As to
97015; October 1998); Los Angeles County Metropolitan
health plans, DOC administers the Knox-Keene Health Care
Transportation Authority: Its Plan for Managing Debt is
Service Plan Act of 1975. While health plan enrollment has
Reasonable (No. 981 19; October 1998); Lahontan Regional
increased significantly in the past 20 years, BTH devotes only
Water Quality Control Board: Has Not Accomplished All of
1 % of its 39,000 employees, and only 5% of its $8 billion
Its Regulatory Work and Has Not Always Vigorously Acted
budget, to DOC's Health Plan Division (Division). Further,
214
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in official proceeding authorized by law). The trial court sus
tained BSA's demurrer; plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, the First District held thatplaintiff's tort claims
were properly dismissed under Civil Code section 47(b),
which immunizes from civil action "a privileged publication
or broadcast," including one made in the course of a legisla
tive proceeding, a judicial proceeding, or "in any other offi
cial proceeding authorized by law." The Reporting Act ex
pressly authorizes the State Auditor to investigate allegations
of improper governmental activity; under Government Code
section 8547(a), if the Auditor determines that there is rea
sonable cause to believe that an employee or state agency has
engaged in any improper governmental activity, "he or she
shall report the nature and details of the activity to the head
of the employing agency, or the appropriate authority. If ap
propriate, the State Auditor shall report this information to
the Attorney General, the policy committees of the Senate
and Assembly having jurisdiction over the subject matter, and
to any other authority that the State Auditor determines ap
Legislation
propriate." Under section 8547.7(b), the head of the employ
ing agency or appropriate appointing authority must then re
AB 2067 (Cuneen), as amended August 17, requires BSA
port
monthly to the State Auditor until "final action has been
to submit a report to the legislature by June 30, 1999 making
taken"
on the report.
recommendations for changes in the structure of the fees
The
court noted that its holding is consistent with nu
which generators of hazardous waste are required to pay to
merous
cases
which have reached the same conclusion with
the State Board of Equalization. This bill was signed by the
respect
to
statements
made in or about other types of govern
Governor on September 26 (Chapter 880, Statutes of 1998).
mental investigations, and other cases which have reasoned
that "a communication to an official administrative agency,
Litigation
which communication is designed to prompt action by that
In a case of first impression, Braun v. Bureau of State
agency, is as much a part of the 'official proceeding' as a
Audits, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1382 (Nov. 23, 1998), the First Dis
communication made after the proceedings have com
trict Court of Appeal held that statements made by BSA in an
menced." The court also stated that "one policy underlying
investigative audit report are ab �-----------·_______ ___
---� the absolute privilege for statesolutely privileged under Civil
ments made in governmental in
.The First Distric� Court ofAppeal;held that
Code 47(b), such that plaintiff's
vestigations and reports of mis
statements made by BSA in an investigative
tort claims against the Bureau
conduct
'is to assure utmost free
-audit report'lre absolutely privileged undef'
were properly dismissed by the
dom
of
communication
between
Civil: Co,:fe 47(b), such that plainJ:ifrs. tort
trial court.
citizens
and
public
authorities
claims against the Bureau were' properly
In early 1994, pursuant to al
whose responsibility is to investi
dismissed by the trial court.
legations submitted under the Re
gate and remedy wrongdoing.'
porting of Improper GovernmenThis consideration is especially
tal Activities Act, Government Code section 8547 et seq., BSA
pertinent here because the express purpose of the Reporting
began an investigative audit of the Center for Pre-hospital
Act is to foster such communications."
Research and Training (CPRn, an activity within the Uni
The court rejected appellant's argument that nothing in
versity of California at San Francisco's (UCSF) School of
the Reporting Act authorizes BSA to make its audit reports
Medicine which supported emergency medical services in the
public. "Although the statute does not expressly refer to the
community. Plaintiff/appellant Odelia Braun was the medi
release of investigative audit reports and findings to the pub
cal director of the CPRT. BSA's 73-page November 1994
lic, the State Auditor submits that this is the statute's intent."
report of its audit found that plaintiff, who was not identified
The court examined the language of section 8547. 7 (c)
by name in the report, and UCSF had "grossly mismanaged"
("[e]very investigative audit shall be kept confidential, ex
the CPRT, and accused plaintiff of "numerous improprieties."
cept that the State Auditor may issue any report of an investi
[15: 1 CRLR 22-23J As a result of the report and publicity
gation that has been substantiated, keeping confidential the
which ensued, plaintiff lost her job and the CPRT was closed.
identity of the individual or individuals involved, or release
Plaintiff sued BSA in tort for compensatory and punitive dam
any findings resulting from an investigation conducted pur
ages; BSA demurred on grounds that its report was absolutely
suant to this article that is deemed necessary to serve the in
privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivisions (a) (pub
terests of the state"), and found support for the Auditor's inlication in the discharge of official duty) and (b) (publication
terpretation.

Against Water Quality Violations (No. 97 123 ; November
1998); State of California: Statement of Securities Account
ability of the State Treasurer's Office (June 30, 1998) (No.
98008; November 1998); Automated Child Support System:
Selection ofInterim System Appears Reasonable (No. 98025;
November 1998); Department of Transportation: Seismic
Retrofit ExpendiJures Comply with the BondAct (No. 98022;
December 1998); Forensic Laboratories: Many Face
Challenges BeyondAccreditation toAssure the Highest Qual
ity Services (No. 97025; December 1998); California Drink
ing Water: State and Local Agencies Need to Provide Lead
ership to Address Contamination of Groundwater by Gaso
line Components andAddiJives (No. 98112; December 1998);
LosAngeles Community College District: Proposed Reforms
Have Not Fully Addressed Past Problems and Create a New
Set of Challenges (No. 97107; December 1998); and State
of California: Financial Report Year Ended June 30, 1998
(No. 98001; December 1998).
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